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OPTIMAL PRICING USING ONLINE AUCTION EXPERIMENTS:
A PO´LYA TREE APPROACH
By Edward I. George and Sam K. Hui
University of Pennsylvania and New York University
We show how a retailer can estimate the optimal price of a new
product using observed transaction prices from online second-price
auction experiments. For this purpose we propose a Bayesian Po´lya
tree approach which, given the limited nature of the data, requires
a specially tailored implementation. Avoiding the need for a priori
parametric assumptions, the Po´lya tree approach allows for flexible
inference of the valuation distribution, leading to more robust esti-
mation of optimal price than competing parametric approaches. In
collaboration with an online jewelry retailer, we illustrate how our
methodology can be combined with managerial prior knowledge to
estimate the profit maximizing price of a new jewelry product.
1. Introduction. As internet auctions become increasingly popular, the
modeling of auction data is capturing the attention of marketing researchers
[Chakravarti et al. (2002)]. For instance, Park and Bradlow (2005) devel-
oped an integrated model to capture the “whether, who, when, and how
much” of bidding behavior; Yao and Mela (2008) proposed a structural
model to describe the buyer and seller behavior in internet auctions and
compute model-based estimates of fee elasticity. Bradlow and Park (2007)
used a generalized record-breaking model to predict observed bids and bid
times in internet auctions.
In this article we turn to the use of internet auctions to estimate the profit-
maximizing price of a new product. Toward that end, we utilize second-price
auction experiments to learn about the consumer valuation distribution of
a population of potential consumers of the focal product, a distribution that
we denote throughout by F . By valuation here we mean the maximum price
that a consumer would be willing to pay for the product.1 Thus, F cap-
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1This valuation is also called the consumer’s reservation price in the economics litera-
ture.
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tures the demand curve, and can readily be used to estimate the optimal
profit-maximizing price. While a variety of methods, for example, direct
elicitation/contingent valuation [Mitchell and Carson (1989)], indirect sur-
vey methods [Breidert (2006)] and conjoint analysis [Green and Srinivasan
(1978)], can also be used for demand estimation, analysis of second-price
internet auctions can provide a useful complementary approach to validate
demand estimates with online field data.
In the literature on demand estimation using auctions, researchers typ-
ically impose specific parametric specifications on consumer valuation dis-
tributions [e.g., Chan, Kadiyali and Park (2007), Park and Bradlow (2005),
Yao and Mela (2008)]. However, in the setting where a retailer tries to set
an optimal price for a new product, it seems unlikely that retailers would
have precise knowledge about the appropriate parametric form for F . Fur-
thermore, the limited nature of available data from second-price auction
experiments makes it particularly difficult to verify the validity of standard
parametric assumptions (e.g., Gaussian, gamma). As will be seen in Sec-
tion 4, if the standard parametric assumptions are invalid, estimation of the
optimal price will be biased, leading to lower profits for the retailer.
To cope with this problem, we propose a specially tailored Bayesian non-
parametric approach [Dey, Mu¨ller and Sinha (1998)] based on the highly
flexible Po´lya tree distribution [Ferguson (1974), Lavine (1992, 1994)] to in-
fer F from second-price auctions. By avoiding the need to impose a more
limited parametric form, this flexibility is well suited for learning about con-
sumer valuation for a new product, in particular, for estimating the profit
maximizing price.
Our approach can be outlined as follows. For a new product, a series of
nonoverlapping, second-price internet auction experiments are conducted.
For each such auction we obtain, using third-party software, the total num-
ber of bidders (who may or may not place a bid)2 and the final transac-
tion price. As discussed in Section 2, we treat internet auctions using an
IPV (Independent Private Value) auction framework [Vickrey (1961)], an
assumption that is widely used in the literature [e.g., Hou and Rego (2007),
Houser and Wooders (2006), Rasmusen (2006), Song (2004)]. Under the IPV
framework, together with reasonable assumptions (discussed later), the final
transaction price of each auction can be considered as equal to the second-
highest valuation among the bidders, plus a small increment.3 Thus, each
2As discussed in Section 2, we treat someone who visits the auctioned product but does
not place a bid as an unobserved bidder whose maximum valuation is below the winning
bid.
3The transaction price is the second-highest bid plus a very small increment ($0.01).
In this paper, we subtract the small increment from the transaction price to obtain the
second-highest bid (and hence the second-highest valuation); see, for example, Song (2004).
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auction provides us with the second highest order statistic of an i.i.d. sam-
ple of known size (the total number of bidders) from the consumer valuation
distribution F .4 We then use our proposed approach to formulate and up-
date a Po´lya tree distribution based on these observed second highest order
statistics, thereby obtaining the posterior distribution of F .
Updating a Po´lya tree distribution using only a set of second highest
order statistics presents an interesting implementation challenge. To tackle
this problem, which to the best of our knowledge has not been addressed in
the literature, we have devised a structured partition scheme that allows for
posterior computation using an inexpensive data augmented Gibbs sampling
algorithm that is similar in spirit to the approach in Paddock (2002).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss
the mechanism of online second-price auctions, present our assumptions, and
argue that the observed transaction price can be considered as the second
highest order statistic of a sample of known size from the valuation distri-
bution. In Section 3 we review the essentials of the Bayesian Po´lya tree ap-
proach, and propose a specially tailored formulation and updating scheme
that can be used to draw inference about a consumer valuation distribu-
tion F using second-price auction data. In Section 4 we present numerical
simulations to illustrate the performance of the proposed method. We then
set forth an empirical application of our model in Section 5 to estimate the
valuation distribution and then derive the optimal pricing of a new jewelry
product using actual auction data together with elicited expert managerial
prior information. Finally, Section 6 concludes with discussion and directions
for future research.
2. Second-price auction data. In this section we discuss the features of
the ascending, second-price online auction considered in this paper, and ar-
gue that the winning bids of such auctions can be used to estimate the valu-
ation distribution of potential consumers of the auctioned product. Through
an example, Section 2.1 reviews the mechanism of the second-price online
auction. In Section 2.2 we argue that, under suitable assumptions, the win-
4Throughout this paper we restrict attention to multiple auctions where it can be as-
sumed that there is no dependence across auctions. We believe this assumption is reason-
able (as discussed in more detail in Section 5) when the auctions are nonoverlapping [which
minimizes information spillover across auctions, e.g., Bapna et al. (2009), Haruvy et al.
(2008), Jank and Zhang (2011)], and when the coming auctions are not pre-announced
before the end of the current auction [which minimizes the opportunity for bidders to
engage in forward-looking behavior, e.g., Zeithammer (2006)]. In our particular applica-
tion, we consider auctions of jewelry products that are heavily differentiated (products
from one retailer are unlikely to be available at competitors), further reducing potential
dependence across auctions. As an empirical check, we examined the autocorrelations of
the time series of final prices (with and without adjusting for number of bidders) and
found no autocorrelation coefficients to be significant.
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ning bid of each auction can be considered as the second highest order statis-
tic of a sample (of size equal to the total number of observed and unobserved
bidders) drawn from the valuation distribution.
2.1. Ascending second-price auctions. Ascending, second-price auctions
are the most common form of internet auctions. In such auctions, the person
with the highest bid wins the item but pays the price of the second-highest
bid, plus a small increment (e.g., $0.01). In the auction application we con-
sider, an automatic “proxy bidding” system is used. Under this system, each
user can, at any time, put in his/her maximum bid, and the system will au-
tomatically increase his/her bid if another bidder puts in a larger bid that is
still below the stated maximum bid. For concreteness, let us illustrate this
proxy bidding system with a hypothetical example.
Suppose bidders A, B, C are bidding on a certain item. Bidder A is willing
to pay $3 for the item; bidders B and C are willing to pay $5 and $10 for
the item, respectively. The starting price of the item is $0.01.
Suppose A enters the auction first, and bids $3. The “current bid” will stay
at $0.01, and A is the current leader. Next, B bids $5. Now, the “current bid”
is increased to $3.01 (i.e., A’s highest bid, plus a small increment), and B
becomes the current leader. Finally, C bids $10. The current bid is now
increased to $5.01, and C is the current leader. Assuming that no more bids
are received, C is the winner of the auction, and pays the final transaction
price of $5.01, which is equal to the amount of the second-highest bid (B’s),
plus a small increment. Note that the highest bid of $10 (C’s bid) is always
unobserved.
In the above example, all bidders are observed: they all placed a bid during
the auction. This is not true in general. In most cases, some of the bidders
are unobserved, that is, the number of observed bids is generally smaller
than the number of bidders. This is because if a bidder’s willingness to pay
is smaller than the “current bid” (at the time when the bidder intends to
place a bid), he will not be able to place a bid. Thus, whether a bidder is
observed or not depends on the timing on which the bidders place their bids.
For instance, take the same set of bidders in the last example (A: $3; B: $5;
C: $10), but assume that they place their bids in the order B→ C→A. In
this case, when A enters, he is unable to place a bid because the current
price ($5.01) is already higher than his valuation of the product ($3). Thus,
A does not bid, and is thus unobserved. Due to the presence of unobserved
bidder(s), the number of bids (in this example, two) is smaller than the total
number of bidders (in this example, three).
Thus, the sequence of bids alone does not tell us the exact number of
bidders in the auction, as some bidders may be unobserved. This issue of
unobserved bidders creates identification problems [e.g., Song (2004)]. To
avoid this problem, it is necessary to use an external source of information to
record the total number of unique bidders who accessed the auction, whether
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or not he/she placed a bid. In our empirical application in Section 5, the
jewelry retailer accomplished this by using third-party tracking software.5
Thus, throughout this paper, we assume that the total number of bidders
in each auction is known.
In this paper we focus on internet auctions that can be suitably mod-
eled with an independent private value (IPV) auction framework [Vickrey
(1961)] as described in Section 2.2 below. The IPV framework is a common
assumption made in the applied econometrics literature to model internet
auctions [e.g., Hou and Rego (2007), Houser and Wooders (2006), Rasmusen
(2006), Song (2004)]. In our empirical application in Section 5, we learned
from the jeweler that most consumers purchase jewelry from internet auc-
tions for their own consumption, and rarely for resale. Thus, an IPV frame-
work seems appropriate (albeit empirically unverifiable6) there—different
consumers value jewelry products differently because of their idiosyncratic
preferences.
It is important to note at this point, however, that an IPV assumption
may not be appropriate in other applications. The IPV assumption will be
violated, for instance, if bidders’ valuations are influenced by the other bids
seen during the auction, or if bidders are trying to figure out the market value
of the auction product (perhaps with resale in mind) [Klemperer (1999)]. In
such situations, the inference about F made by our proposed methodology
(which explicitly assumes IPV auctions) may be questionable, and the results
should be viewed with caution.
2.2. Transaction price and second highest order statistics. According to
economic theory [Vickrey (1961)], in a second-price auction, the dominant
strategy for each consumer is to place a bid that is equal to his/her valuation
of the product (i.e., the highest price he/she is willing to pay for the item).
Thus, we make the following assumption:
Assumption I. Each bidder will try to place a bid equal to his/her
valuation of the product at some time before the end of the auction if the
current price has not yet exceeded his/her valuation (in which case he/she
will not place a bid).
Note that the only assumption made about bidder behavior is that each
bidder will try to bid his/her valuation before the end of the auction; be-
yond that, no assumptions are made about a bidder’s visitation and bidding
5The tracking software records the total number of unique IPs that have accessed our
auction. The assumption here is that the number of unique IPs is equal to the number of
unique bidders. This may not be true if the same person uses two different computers to
view our product page; this limitation can be resolved in the future if one can track the
unique userIDs instead of the IPs.
6See, for example, Boatwright, Borle and Kadane (2010), Laffont and Vuong (1996).
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behavior during the auction. Specifically, the assumption does not preclude
bidders with multiple visits and/or multiple bids. It allows for the possibility
that a bidder may not want to bid on her first visit, but wait till almost the
end of the auction to place such a bid [i.e., “sniping” or last minute bidding;
e.g., Roth and Ockenfels (2002)]. Or, that she may want to place a smaller
bid on her first visit, followed by a bid equal to her valuation by the end of
the auction, if the current price is still lower than her valuation [e.g., mul-
tiple bidding behavior, Ockenfels and Roth (2006)]. All of these (and other
behaviors) are allowed under Assumption I.
Under Assumption I, the observed final transaction price can be consid-
ered as equal to the second-highest valuation (plus a small increment) of all
the bidders regardless of the bidder’s order of arrival.7 This is because the
bidders with the first and second-highest valuations will always bid, that
is, the current price is never higher than their valuations before they bid,
regardless of the order by which other bidders place their bids [Song (2004)].
Similar to the previous literature on auction demand estimation [e.g.,
Adams (2007), Baldwin, Marshall and Richard (1997), Canals-Cerda and
Pearcy (2010), Song (2004)], the following further two assumptions about
the sample of bidders in each auction allow us to use the observed transaction
prices to make inference about F :
Assumption II. The set of bidders (observed or unobserved) in an auc-
tion is an i.i.d. sample from the population of all potential consumers of the
auctioned product.
Assumption III. The set of (mostly unobserved) latent product valu-
ations for each of these bidders is an i.i.d. sample drawn from the valuation
distribution F .
With the addition of these assumptions, the final transaction price minus
the small increment can thus be treated as the second largest order statistic
of an i.i.d. sample from F . By conducting a set of identical, independent
auction experiments, we can therefore collect a set of second highest order
statistics and associated sample sizes (i.e., the total number of bidders, ob-
served or unobserved, in each auction) from a set of i.i.d. samples from F . In
Section 3 we describe how such data can be used to draw inference about F .
Let us conclude this section with a brief discussion of why we only consider
the final transaction price, but not the entire sequence of “current prices” for
inference about F . Unlike the final transaction price, the sequence of current
intermediate prices is dependent on the order by which bidders submit their
bids. Thus, the second highest current price, for instance, is not equal to the
7We assume that there will always be two or more bidders, which is the case for our
empirical application.
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third highest valuation in general. To see this, consider the following example
with four bidders with the following valuations: (A: $3, B: $5, C: $10, D: $15).
Suppose the bidders place their bids in the order of A→ C→D→ B. Here,
the final transaction price is $10.01, which is equal to the second-highest
valuation ($10) plus a small increment. The second highest current price
($3.01), however, does not correspond to the third highest valuation ($5),
because bidder B is unable to bid. Thus, absent strong assumptions on
the process of bid submissions, the sequence of “current prices” provides
only limited information about F . Fortunately, as will be seen in Section 4,
restricting attention to only the second-highest final bids lead to reasonably
accurate inference about the profit-maximizing price.
3. Methodology for inference about F . This section describes our pro-
posed Po´lya tree approach to inferring the valuation distribution F from
the second highest order statistics obtained by second-price auctions as de-
scribed in Section 2. We begin by defining notation in Section 3.1, and then
briefly describe, in Section 3.2, a general alternative parametric approach
that we use as a benchmark for later comparisons in Sections 4 and 5. In
Section 3.3 we present our nonparametric Po´lya tree approach and its im-
plementation in detail.
3.1. The set of second highest order statistics. Throughout this article,
we use the following notation to denote the auction data. Let yij be the
valuation of the jth bidder (j = 1, . . . ,Ni) in the ith auction (i= 1, . . . ,M ).
Without loss of generality, we rearrange the consumer indexes so that yiNi <
· · · < yi2 < yi1. Of these valuations, as described above, we assume that
only yi1 and yi2 correspond to actual bids, and that of these only yi2 is
observed. Thus, for each auction, we observe only the second highest valua-
tion yi2 and the total number of bidders Ni (observed and unobserved) who
viewed the auction. For convenience, in our later development and again
without loss of generality, we further rearrange the auction indices so that
yM2 < · · ·< y22 < y12. The essential statistical challenge here is to draw in-
ference about F based only on this set of second highest order statistics.
3.2. A parametric Bayesian approach to infer F . If an appropriate para-
metric form for F could be specified, for example, the family of gamma dis-
tributions or the family of truncated-normal distributions, then implemen-
tation of the following parametric Bayes approach would be straightforward.
Letting θ denote the index of the specified family, the likelihood of θ given
the observed second-price auction data would be directly obtained as the
product of the order statistic yi2 densities, namely,
M∏
i=1
p(yi2|Ni, θ) =
M∏
i=1
Ni(Ni − 1)[1−Ψ(yi2|θ)][Ψ(yi2|θ)]
Ni−2ψ(yi2|θ),(1)
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where Ψ(·) and ψ(·) here denote the CDF and PDF of the parametric form,
respectively [Casella and Berger (2001)]. The posterior distribution for θ
could then be obtained by using the likelihood, implicit in (1), to update
a prior distribution for θ. When simple analytical posterior forms were un-
available, Markov chain Monte Carlo posterior calculation could be used to
sample θ from the posterior [Robert and Casella (2004)].
Despite its clear appeal and straightforward implementation, the perfor-
mance of such a parametric approach will rely heavily on the appropriateness
of the assumed parametric family, as will be seen in Section 4. This could
be especially problematic in a new product setting where prior information
would be unavailable for guiding such a selection, and where data consisting
of only second highest order statistics would offer little guidance for validat-
ing any such selection. To avoid the possible misspecification of a parametric
family, we propose an alternative Bayesian Po´lya tree approach below. As
will be seen, this Po´lya tree approach completely avoids the use of (1).
3.3. A nonparametric Bayesian Po´lya tree approach. Our proposed non-
parametric Bayesian approach for inference about F is based on Po´lya tree
distribution representations [Ferguson (1974), Lavine (1992, 1994)], which
we briefly review below in Section 3.3.1. In Section 3.3.2 we then propose
a suitably tailored Po´lya tree prior formulation for second-price auction data.
In Section 3.3.3 we describe a fast computational procedure for posterior
updating of this formulation, and in Section 3.3.4 describe how inferential
statistics based on this output can be obtained.
3.3.1. Overview of the Po´lya tree approach. Here we provide a brief re-
view of the Po´lya tree model. For more details, including theoretical re-
sults and statistical properties, readers may refer to Ferguson (1974), Lavine
(1992, 1994), Mauldin, Sudderth and Williams (1992), Muliere and Walker
(1997) and Walker et al. (1999).
A Po´lya tree distribution is a probability distribution on probability mea-
sures, which can be seen as a generalization of the widely used Dirich-
let processes. A Po´lya tree distribution with parameters Π and A, de-
noted PT(Π,A), is determined by a nested binary recursive partition Π =
(B0,B1,B00,B01, . . .) of the range of F , together with a set of hyperparame-
ters A= (α0, α1, α00, α01, . . .) that govern the allocation of random probabil-
ities to each set of the partition Π. Indexing the sets by ε= ε1 · · · εm, where
εi = 0 or 1, a Po´lya tree distribution assigns random conditional probabili-
ties to the sets such that (i) p(Bε0|Bε) =Cε0 where each Cε0 ∼Be(αε0, αε1)
is a beta random variable, (ii) p(Bε1|Bε) =Cε1 = 1−Cε0, and (iii) the Cε0’s
are all independent. Thus, under a Po´lya tree distribution PT(Π,A), the
probability of any set Bε ∈Π is the random probability
P (Bε1···εm |A) =
m∏
i=1
Cε1···εi .(2)
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Now suppose we regard PT(Π,A) as a prior distribution for our unknown F ,
that is, suppose we treat F as if it were a realization of (2) from PT(Π,A).
An appealing feature of this formulation is that, given data from F , the
posterior on F is then also a Po´lya tree distribution, which can be obtained
by a straightforward update of the hyperparameters. More precisely, given
an observation x from F , the hyperparameters A= (α0, α1, α00, α01, . . .) of
the Po´lya tree posterior on F are updated by
αε|x=
{
αε + 1, if x ∈Bε,
αε, otherwise.
(3)
Note that (2) also illustrates how the hyperparameters A = (α0, α1, α00,
α01, . . .) control the “strength” of the Po´lya tree prior. The larger the α’s,
the less the influence of an observation on the underlying beta distribution
update.
Going further, it turns out that PT(Π,A) can also be efficiently updated
with only the partial information that x ∈ Bε but not whether x ∈ Bε0 or
x ∈Bε1 [Muliere and Walker (1997)]. In such cases, it suffices to update αε
to αε + 1 but leave αε0 and αε1 unchanged, so that in effect we only need
update the hyperparameters up to the known resolution of the data. In the
next subsection we describe a partition formulation for Π that will allow
us to exploit this feature when updating a Po´lya tree prior on F with the
partial information supplied by second-price auction data.
The last essential ingredient for the specification of a Po´lya model PT(Π,
A) is the choice of a base measure H over the range of F , which may be
considered as a prior estimate of F . For a given partition Π, PT(Π,A) can
then be centered at H by choosing A via
αε = γmH(Bε),(4)
where γm > 0 is a preselected function of the level
8 (depth) m ≡ m(ε)
of the partition indexed by ε [Muliere and Walker (1997)]. By using γm
that increase with m, the influence of the data via (3) can be lessened
for the deeper levels of the partition, thereby stabilizing the posterior at
those levels. Indeed, for the choice γm = km
2, F ∼ PT(Π,A) will be abso-
lutely continuous with probability one, whereas when γm ≡ γ is constant
for all m,PT(Π,A) reduces to a discrete Dirichlet process [Ferguson (1974),
Lavine (1992, 1994)].
3.3.2. Formulating a Po´lya tree prior for second highest bid auction data.
The formulation of a Po´lya tree prior PT(Π0,A0) requires the specifications
of a recursive partition Π0 = (B0,B1,B00,B01, . . .) and a set of hyperparam-
eters A0 = (α0, α1, α00, α01, . . .) associated with the sets of the partition. Let
8For example, the set B0100 has level m= 4.
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Fig. 1. The construction of Π0 for the Po´lya tree prior.
us now consider suitable formulations of Π0 and A0 for the second-price
auction data setup.
We begin with the specification of Π0, the recursive partition of the range
of F that for our application is [0,∞). For observed second highest bid
auction data yM2 < · · ·< y22 < y12, we propose the left-telescoping partition
hierarchy (B1 >B01 > · · ·) with cut points at the observed yi2’s, namely,
B0 = (0, y12); B1 = [y12,∞);
B00 = (0, y22); B01 = [y22, y12);
(5)
...
...
B00...0 = (0, yM2); B00...1 = [yM2, y(M−1)2),
depicted graphically in Figure 1. We have formulated this partition to facil-
itate posterior incorporation of all the second-price auction information in
a computationally efficient manner. This information consists not only of the
observed ordered values of the second-highest valuations, yM2 < · · ·< y22 <
y12, but also includes the ordering of the unobserved valuations, namely,
yij < yi2 (j > 2) and yi2 < yi1 for each auction i. As will be seen in Sec-
tion 3.3.3, posterior incorporation of the yij < yi2 (j > 2) information with
this partition can be done directly through the simple updating formula (3),
and posterior incorporation of the yi2 < yi1 information can be done with
a multiple imputation scheme based on a Gibbs sampler. The use of the left-
telescoping hierarchy (5) is why imputation is only needed for the yi2 < yi1
ordering information. As demonstrated in the Web Appendix I [George and
Hui (2011)], alternative hierarchies would require the imputation of many
more values, vastly increasing the computational burden of posterior updat-
ing.
OPTIMAL PRICING USING ONLINE AUCTION EXPERIMENTS 11
Turning to the specification of A0 for this partition Π0, we propose the
use of αε = γmH(Bε) in (4) with a base measure H over [0,∞), which
reflects available prior information. In our empirical example in Section 5.3,
we illustrate the elicitation of such an H based on an expert’s subjective
judgments. We then consider the corresponding specification of A0 using
γm = km
2 with various values of k. In the absence of prior information,
a seemingly reasonable default would be to let H be a uniform distribution
over [0, y∗], where y∗ is the maximum possible valuation of the new product.9
For this H,H(Bε) would be proportional to the length of Bε, when Bε is
bounded. Alternatively, the choice of a proper distribution H with support
[0,∞) would avoid the need to specify such a y∗ while still ensuring that
αε = γmH(Bε) in (4) would be finite for any Bε.
3.3.3. Updating the Po´lya tree prior given second-price auction data. Let-
ting D denote our second-price auction data, we are now ready to describe
how our Po´lya tree prior PT(Π0,A0), with Π0 in (5), can be conveniently
updated to obtain the posterior Po´lya tree distribution PT(Π0,A0|D) for F .
Recall that under the assumptions discussed in Section 2.2, each of the M
second-price auctions is associated with an i.i.d. sample of Ni latent valu-
ations yiNi < · · · < yi2 < yi1 from F . Of these, we only observe the second
highest order statistics yM2 < · · ·< y22 < y12 from each sample. The follow-
ing update of PT(Π0,A0), based on just this information, is accomplished
by exploiting the particular form of Π0.
To begin with, the observed second highest bids yM2 < · · ·< y22 < y12 by
definition satisfy yi2 ∈ [yi2, y(i−1)2) =B00. . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−1
1, so that, for i≥ 2,
yi2 ∈B00. . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−1
1 ∈B00. . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−1
∈ · · · ∈B0,(6)
a consequence of the nesting of the sets in Π0. Next, although we do not
observe yi3, . . . , yiNi , we do know that yi2 > yi3 > · · ·> yiNi , so that yi3, . . . ,
yiNi ∈ (0, yi2) =B00. . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i
and, again because of the nesting in Π0,
yiNi , yi(Ni−1), . . . , yi3 ∈B00. . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i
∈B00. . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−1
∈ · · · ∈B0.(7)
Thus, to update the Po´lya tree prior for all but the maximum valuations y11,
y21, . . . , yM1, we simply increment the A0 hyperparameter values via (3) as
follows. For each auction i, we count one value yi2 in each of B0,B00, . . . ,
B00. . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−1
,B00. . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−1
1 and (Ni − 2) values in each of B0,B00, . . . ,B00. . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i
.
9We recommend and hence assume that y∗ has been chosen large enough to be well
beyond what anyone would conceivably pay for the product.
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Table 1
The number of observations in each partition, given zi’s
Partition Count Partition Count
B0
∑
M
i=1(Ni − 1) +
∑
M
i=1 I{zi ≥ 2} − 1 B1
∑
M
i=1 I{zi = 1}+ 1
B00
∑
M
i=2(Ni − 1) +
∑
M
i=1 I{zi ≥ 3} − 1 B01
∑
M
i=1 I{zi = 2}+ 1
B00. . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
∑
M
i=k(Ni − 1) +
∑
M
i=1 I{zi ≥ k+ 1} − 1 B00. . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
k−1
1
∑
M
i=1 I{zi = k}+ 1
B00. . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
(NM − 1)− 1 B00. . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
M−1
1
∑
M
i=1 I{zi =M}+ 1
Beyond the updating above, the only values left to consider are the max-
imum valuations y11, y21, . . . , yM1. Except for y11, which must be located in
[y12,∞) =B1, there is uncertainty about the Bε location of these maximum
values. For instance, consider y21; as shown in Figure 1, given that y21 > y22
by definition, we know that y21 must be located in either B01 or B1, but
we do not know which one. What we do know is that each yi1 is located in
some Bε where the binary index ε consists of (k − 1) 0’s followed by a sin-
gle 1 for some k = 1, . . . , i. To incorporate this partial information about
the location of y11, y21, . . . , yM1 into the posterior update of F , we propose
a Gibbs sampler similar to the algorithm proposed by Paddock (2002).
For i= 1, . . . ,M , let zi ∈ {1, . . . , i} where zi = k⇒ yi1 ∈B00. . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
k−1
1 indicates
the partition membership of yi1. Thus, the remaining uncertainty about
the update of A0 concerns only the unknown values of Z = (z1, z2, . . . , zM ).
Indeed, together with the membership information in (6) and (7), the values
of Z, if known, would yield the complete membership information indicated
in Table 1. This information would then enable a complete update of A0
via (3), which would in turn let us simulate a draw of CΠ, the set of Cε0’s
corresponding to the partition Π.
These observations provide the basis for the following Gibbs sampler up-
dating scheme. First, we simulate CΠ from P (CΠ|A0,D,Z), where each Cε0|
A0,D,Z ∼ Be(α
D,Z
ε0 , α
D,Z
ε1 ) is drawn independently based on the (D,Z)-
updated values of A0, namely, (α
D,Z
ε0 , α
D,Z
ε1 ). Second, conditionally on CΠ,
the entries of Z are conditionally independent.10 Thus, we simulate the un-
known values of Z from P (Z|CΠ) which are given by
P (zi = 1|CΠ) = P (yi1 ∈B1|CΠ) = ciC1,
10This follows immediately from the fact that conditionally on the realization of CΠ, the
probabilities for the Po´lya tree, theM largest bids for each of the samples, y11, y21, . . . , yM1,
are conditionally independent.
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P (zi = 2|CΠ) = P (yi1 ∈B01|CΠ) = ciC1C01,
(8)
...
P (zi = i|CΠ) = P (yi1 ∈B00. . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−1
1|CΠ) = ciC1C01 · · ·C00. . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−1
1,
where ci denotes the normalizing constant such that the above probabilities
sum up to 1. This follows directly from (2) and the fact that normaliza-
tion is needed to account for the membership restrictions on yi1, because
our auction data is sorted. By iteratively simulating from P (CΠ|A0,D,Z)
followed by P (Z|CΠ) in this manner, this Gibbs sampler can be used to sim-
ulate a sequence of CΠ that is converging in distribution to P (CΠ|A0,D),
the posterior of CΠ under PT(Π0,A0|D).
3.3.4. Inference about F . It follows from (2) that under each realization
of CΠ from the Po´lya tree posterior PT(Π0,A0|D), the probability of a set
Bε1···εm ∈Π0 is given by
P (Bε1···εm |A0,D) =
m∏
i=1
Cε1···εi .(9)
For the purpose of estimating these probabilities, and hence F , a natural
estimate in this context is the posterior expectation of (9), namely,
E[P (Bε1···εm|A0,D)] =E
[
m∏
i=1
Cε1···εi |A0,D
]
,(10)
which we can in turn estimate as follows. Based on a sequence of T draws from
the sequence of CΠ from the Gibbs sampler (ignoring s burn-in iterations),
we estimate (10) by the Rao-Blackwellized version of 1
T
∑t=s+T
t=s
∏m
i=1C
(t)
ε1···εi ,
namely,
1
T
t=s+T∑
t=s
E
(
m∏
i=1
C
(t)
ε1···εi |A0,D,Z
(t)
)
=
1
T
t=s+T∑
t=s
m∏
i=1
α
(t)
ε1···εi
α
(t)
ε1···εi−10
+α
(t)
ε1···εi−11
,(11)
where α
(t)
ε1···εi is the updated value of αε1···εi in A0 based on D and Z
(t). This
is our posterior estimate of F . The uncertainty of (11) as an estimate of (10),
due to the unknown values of Z = (z1, z2, . . . , zM ), can be summarized by
suitable quantiles of the T values of
∏m
i=1[α
(t)
ε1···εi/(α
(t)
ε1···εi−10
+ α
(t)
ε1···εi−11
)]
appearing in (10). Finally, the uncertainty of (11) as an estimate of (9)
can be summarized by suitable quantiles of the corresponding T values
of
∏m
i=1C
(t)
ε1···εi from the Gibbs sequence.
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4. Simulation study. In this section we compare the performance of our
proposed Po´lya tree method with Bayesian parametric approaches for esti-
mating profit-maximizing prices. We consider parametric approaches based
on the gamma and truncated-normal distributions, two parametric distri-
butions commonly used in marketing research. For the posterior calculation
with these parametric methods, we used a random-walk Metropolis–Hasting
algorithm [Robert and Casella (2004)]. We also study the relationship be-
tween sample size and the accuracy of the estimators.
4.1. Data simulation. We conducted three sets of simulation experiments,
each using data simulated from a different functional form for the under-
lying valuation distribution F . For the data from each F , we applied our
Po´lya tree approach and the two parametric Bayesian approaches, all using
relatively noninfluential priors, to compute the profit-maximizing price and
the corresponding expected profit. For the Po´lya tree prior PT(Π0,A0) with
partition Π0 in (5), we set the hyperparameters A0 using αε = km
2H(Bε)
with H uniform on [0, y∗]11 as discussed in Section 3.3.2, with m =m(ε)
denoting the level (depth) of Bε, and with k set to a small but posi-
tive number δ(= e−20) in order to limit the αε’s to being weakly infor-
mative. For the gamma(a, b) and truncated-normal(µ,σ2) approaches we
used the diffuse priors a, b∼ truncated-normal(0,1002), µ∼N(0,1002) and
σ ∼ truncated-normal(0,1002).
We evaluate the performance of each method by the expected profit gen-
erated from their estimated profit-maximizing price. First, their profit max-
imizing price is obtained by maximizing an estimated expected (per-bidder)
profit function based on the estimate Fˆ of F ,
xˆ= argmax
x
pˆi(x) = argmax
x
(1− Fˆ (x))(x− c).
Their corresponding expected (per-bidder) profit is then obtained by plug-
ging xˆ into the actual (“true”) profit function:
pi(xˆ) = (1−F (xˆ))(xˆ− c).
In each case, the per-unit cost c is taken to be $5.2 (the actual per-unit cost
for the application in Section 5). Note that the (per-bidder) profit function
is defined by multiplying the proportion of bidders who have a valuation
higher than price x [i.e., 1−F (x)] and the profit for each sale (x− c).
The density functions corresponding to the three underlying F distribu-
tions we used are shown in Figure 2. For the first set of simulations, the
underlying F is a gamma distribution with shape parameter 0.32 and rate
11We set y∗ = $20 here to conform to the bound considered in our empirical application
in Section 5.3.
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Fig. 2. “True” underlying valuation distributions used in the simulation studies. Solid
line: gamma(0.32,0.26); broken line: equally weighted mixture of gamma(0.32,0.26) and
truncated-normal(5.0,1.0); dotted line: uniform(2.3,6.3).
parameter 0.26 (values chosen to replicate features of the actual data in our
empirical application in Section 5). For the second set of simulations, the
underlying F is an equally weighted mixture of the gamma(0.32,0.26) and
truncated-normal(5.0,1.0) distributions. From a managerial perspective, this
corresponds to a market with two distinct consumer segments with different
average valuations. From a statistical perspective, this corresponds to a bi-
modal distribution for which both of our parameter approaches are misspec-
ified. For the third set of simulations, the underlying F is uniform(2.3,6.3)
(centered near the average observed transaction prices in our empirical ap-
plication). This is similar to the distribution used in Jank and Zhang (2011).
From each of these three F ’s, we simulated three data sets containing
M = 1,000,100 and 16 auctions (the number of auctions in our empirical
application). Varying the sample size here sheds light on the relationship
between the sample size and the precision of the optimal-price and expected
profit estimates. For each auction, we simulated the number of bidders from
a Poisson distribution with mean 18.5 (the average number of bidders in
our empirical application).12 We then drew the bidders’ valuations from F ,
12We repeated this entire simulation using a Poisson distribution with mean 37 and
found the performance of our Po´lya tree approach to be even better with this larger
average number of bidders.
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Table 2
Simulation results. The standard errors are shown in brackets
Po´lya tree Gamma Truncated-normal
Profit Profit Profit
Price ($0.01/bidder) Price ($0.01/bidder) Price ($0.01/bidder)
(a) For gamma(0.32,0.27) distribution
M = 1,000 8.45 6.25 8.38 6.36 6.57 4.92
(0.22) (0.04) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
M = 100 9.13 5.72 8.29 6.33 6.54 4.86
(0.23) (0.10) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
M = 16 8.77 5.45 8.18 6.16 6.54 4.83
(0.23) (0.11) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
(b) For equally weighted mixture between gamma(0.32,0.27) and truncated-normal(5.0,1.0)
M = 1,000 5.97 8.05 6.45 6.94 6.15 7.89
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
M = 100 6.20 7.85 6.40 7.12 6.16 7.79
(0.13) (0.09) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
M = 16 6.49 7.16 6.41 7.04 6.29 7.19
(0.15) (0.15) (0.02) (0.06) (0.04) (0.12)
(c) For uniform(2.3,6.3) distribution
M = 1,000 5.77 7.53 6.31 0.13 5.68 7.43
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.00) (0.01)
M = 100 5.76 7.43 6.22 2.09 5.68 7.39
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.09) (0.00) (0.01)
M = 16 5.78 7.14 6.26 1.61 5.76 6.94
(0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.17) (0.03) (0.16)
keeping only the second highest. To account for sample-to-sample variation,
we repeated the M = 1,000 case 10 times, and the M = 100 and M = 16
cases 100 times, reporting the standard errors along with the mean.
4.2. Simulation results. A key feature of our Po´lya tree approach is ro-
bust estimation of the profit-maximizing price in the sense that, compared
to parametric methods, it is less sensitive to a misspecified form for the con-
sumer valuation distribution F . Although we would not expect it to perform
as well as a correctly prespecified parametric method, we would like it to
perform better than an incorrectly prespecified parametric method. Such
performance is precisely borne out by our first simulation where the true F
was a gamma distribution. As shown in Table 2(a), the best performance
was obtained by the gamma parametric approach, for which the estimated
profit-maximizing price was closest to the true value, leading to the high-
est expected profit. As expected, the Po´lya tree approach performed slightly
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Table 3
Performance of each method (PT, gamma, truncated-normal)
compared to the profit under optimal price
Po´lya tree Gamma Trunc-normal
(a) M = 1,000
True: gamma −1.7% 0.0% −22.6%
True: mixture −0.4% −14.1% −2.4%
True: uniform −0.4% −98.3% −1.7%
(b) M = 100
True: gamma −10.1% −0.5% −23.6%
True: mixture −2.8% −11.9% −3.6%
True: uniform −1.7% −72.4% −2.2%
(c) M = 16
True: gamma −14.3% −3.1% −24.1%
True: mixture −11.4% −12.9% −11.0%
True: uniform −5.6% −78.7% −8.2%
worse than the “correctly specified” gamma parametric method but substan-
tially better than the “incorrectly specified” truncated-normal distribution
method.
Turning to the second simulation in Table 2(b), where the true F was
an equally-weighted mixture of gamma and truncated-normal distributions,
the Po´lya tree method performed best in every case except one, where the
size of auctions M = 16 was small and the truncated-normal approach per-
formed slightly better. Finally, for the third simulation in Table 2(c), when
the true F was a uniform distribution, the Po´lya tree method clearly outper-
formed both parametric approaches, a situation where the performance of
the gamma approach was particularly bad. Taken together, the three simula-
tions illustrate how, in contrast to the robustness of the Po´lya tree approach,
the parametric approaches can perform poorly when the parametric form is
misspecified.
Table 3(a)–(c) summarizes the results in Table 2(a)–(c) by comparing the
percentage profit loss (compared to the profit under optimal price), for each
method, across the different values of M . As can be seen in Table 3(a)–(c),
the performance of the Po´lya tree method is more robust compared to other
methods, in the sense that it offers the best worst-case performance, a min-
imax kind of appeal. By avoiding the need for a prespecified functional
form, the Po´lya tree method avoids the potentially poor performance due
to misspecfication (e.g., using the parametric gamma method in the third
simulation). Finally, with respect to sample size and estimation accuracy,
we note that the estimation accuracy of all the methods deteriorates with
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Table 4
Sorted data from the sixteen online second-price auction experiments
Ni 25 12 22 21 20 27 19 13
yi2 10.05 8.50 5.51 5.50 5.49 5.12 4.69 4.25
Ni 19 12 17 22 14 13 25 16
yi2 3.73 3.53 3.25 2.34 2.26 2.02 1.50 1.25
smaller sample sizes M . The results in Tables 2 and 3 further suggest that if
the number of auctions M is very small (16), it may be helpful to introduce
managerial knowledge through a prior distribution on the valuation distribu-
tion. For that purpose, the Po´lya tree approach offers the flexibility of being
able to incorporate prior knowledge by centering the Po´lya tree prior around
any base measure H , whereas for parametric methods, prior knowledge is
restricted to prior distributions over the parameters of a particular form.
5. Empirical application. In this section we apply our method to esti-
mate the profit-maximizing price of a new jewelry product based on actual
data obtained from second-price auction experiments. In Section 5.1 we de-
scribe the experiments and provide an overview of the data. In Section 5.2
we apply and compare our Po´lya tree approach with parametric approaches
based on the gamma and truncated-normal distributions. In Section 5.3 we
take a step further to illustrate the incorporation into our estimation pro-
cedure of a manager’s elicited prior beliefs about the consumer valuation
distribution.
5.1. Data overview. In collaboration with an online jewelry retailer, a to-
tal of M = 16 identical, nonoverlapping, second-price auction experiments
were conducted on a major internet auction site from February 25, 2006
to March 20, 2006. Each auction lasted 24 hours, starting and ending at
midnight. The transaction price of the completed auction was recorded and
adjusted for the small increment to obtain the bidders’ second highest valu-
ation yi2. Using third-party tracking software, the jeweler also recorded the
total number of unique users who viewed each auction (i.e., the total number
of bidders). The sorted data are shown in Table 4. To increase the chance
of observing some bidding activity in each auction, the starting price was
always set to $0.01 with free shipping. As it turned out, each auction had
at least twelve bidders, so that the second-highest bid was indeed observed
in each auction. For the jewelry product we considered, the per-unit cost c
was constant and equal to $5.20.
5.2. Posterior inference for the valuation distribution in the absence of
prior information. For the case where prior information was unavailable,
we applied the methods considered in Section 4, namely, our proposed Po´lya
OPTIMAL PRICING USING ONLINE AUCTION EXPERIMENTS 19
Table 5
First two columns: the partition scheme Π0 used in the empirical
application. The third column is used to set A0 to approximate the
manager’s prior beliefs
Prior probability
Partition Interval pε =H(Bε)
B0 (0.00, 10.05) 0.901
B1 [10.05, ∞) 0.099
B00 (0.00, 8.50) 0.870
B01 [8.50, 10.05) 0.031
B000 (0.00, 5.51) 0.731
B001 [5.51, 8.50) 0.139
B0000 (0.00, 5.50) 0.730
B0001 [5.50, 5.51) 0.001
B00000 (0.00, 5.49) 0.729
B00001 [5.49, 5.50) 0.001
B000000 (0.00, 5.12) 0.707
B000001 [5.12, 5.49) 0.022
B0000000 (0.00, 4.69) 0.685
B0000001 [4.69, 5.12) 0.023
B00000000 (0.00, 4.25) 0.663
B00000001 [4.25, 4.69) 0.022
B000000000 (0.00, 3.73) 0.637
B000000001 [3.73, 4.25) 0.026
B0000000000 (0.00, 3.53) 0.627
B0000000001 [3.53, 3.73) 0.010
B00000000000 (0.00, 3.25) 0.613
B00000000001 [3.25, 3.53) 0.014
B000000000000 (0.00, 2.34) 0.534
B000000000001 [2.34, 3.25) 0.079
B0000000000000 (0.00, 2.26) 0.526
B0000000000001 [2.26, 2.34) 0.008
B00000000000000 (0.00, 2.02) 0.502
B00000000000001 [2.02, 2.26) 0.024
B000000000000000 (0.00, 1.50) 0.450
B000000000000001 [1.50, 2.02) 0.052
B0000000000000000 (0.00, 1.25) 0.425
B0000000000000001 [1.25, 1.50) 0.025
tree method and the gamma and truncated-normal parametric Bayesian
methods with the weakly informative prior distributions, to the auction
data in Table 4. For the Po´lya tree method, we used the partition Π0 in (5),
given by the first two columns of Table 5. Notice how the partition elements
only split on the leftmost set at each level.
The estimates of the valuation distribution F for each method are shown
in Figure 3, and the estimated profit functions (along with the estimated
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Fig. 3. Estimates of the valuation distributions F by the three different methods: Po´lya
tree (solid line); gamma (broken line); truncated-normal (dotted line).
optimal prices for each method) are shown in Figure 4. We see that while
the overall shapes of the valuation distributions are quite similar across all
three methods, the quantiles of the three distributions differ widely. For
instance, the median valuation is $0.85 for the Po´lya tree method, $0.29 for
the gamma method and $1.13 for the truncated-normal method. Thus, the
resulting inference of the optimal price is similarly highly sensitive to the
particular assumption made for the functional form. The estimated optimal
price using the Po´lya tree method is $12.6, while the estimated optimal
prices from gamma and truncated-normal parametric methods are $8.63
and $6.69, respectively.
5.3. Incorporating elicited managerial prior beliefs. As discussed early,
an appealing additional feature of the Bayesian Po´lya tree method is how
prior beliefs about F can be straightforwardly incorporated into the Po´lya
tree prior PT(Π0,A0). We illustrate this here with the construction of a prior
that incorporates an expert’s beliefs about the valuation distribution F of
potential consumers for the auctioned jewelry product. It is worth noting
that it is not clear how to incorporate the elicited beliefs described below
into the parametric priors that we have been discussing.
In an interview with the manager of the online jewelry retailer behind
our auctions, we used the following subjective CDF construction method
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Fig. 4. Estimated profit functions for the Po´lya tree method (solid line), gamma (broken
line); truncated-normal (dotted line).
[Berger (1985), page 81] to elicit his prior belief about F . Asking him to
imagine a hypothetical random sample of 100 consumers, the manager was
asked to state X for various Y values in the following statement: “If the
price is set at Y dollars, X (out of 100) consumers are willing to buy the
product.” Table 6 shows the set of the manager’s responses [i.e., (X,Y) pairs].
By joining these points with linear segments, these responses were converted
into a cdf, which we denote by H .13
Again using the partition Π0 in Table 5, we proceeded to set A0 so that
the prior PT(Π0,A0) approximates the manager’s prior beliefs. For this pur-
pose, we set αε = km
2pε, the special case of αε = γmH(Bε) discussed in
Section 3.3.2 with pε =H(Bε) and m the level of Bε. This setting serves to
center the prior at prior probabilities pε =H(Bε), shown in the third col-
umn of Table 5, which match the manager’s prior H . For k, we considered
various values k = δ,10,20,50, to gauge the effects of different levels of prior
uncertainty on the posterior for F .14 Larger k reflects a more certain prior
assessment of F , yielding a posterior distribution that is less influenced by
the observed data.
13Note that this elicitation method did not capture the manger’s “uncertainty” around
his prior belief. Future research may consider how to best capture this uncertainty.
14As in the simulations in Section 4, we again set δ = e−20 to be positive but small.
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Table 6
Manager’s prior beliefs about the consumer valuation
distribution
. . .X (out of 100) consumers are
If the price is set at $Y. . . willing to buy the jewelry product
0.01 98
0.50 70
1.00 60
2.00 50
3.00 40
5.00 30
7.50 15
10.00 10
12.00 7
14.00 6
15.00 2
20.00 0
For the prior PT(Π0,A0) choices described above, we estimated the profit-
maximizing price. Figure 5 shows the various estimated valuation distribu-
tions which incorporate the manager’s prior beliefs. The resulting posterior
estimates are shown for the four values of k : δ (top broken line), 10 (sec-
ond broken line), 20 (third broken line), and 50 (bottom broken line), along
with the manager’s prior beliefs about F (solid line). These results provide
a number of insights. First, as can be seen in the figure, all the posterior
estimates of F are above the prior H , suggesting that consumers here have
a stochastically lower valuation of the product than that suggested by the
manager’s prior beliefs. Second, we observe that with smaller values of k,
as expected, the posterior estimate is more influenced by the second-price
auction data and less influenced by the prior.
Next, we turn to estimating the profit-maximizing price for each value
of k. The profit function for each value of k, along with the estimated profit
maximizing price, is shown in Figure 6. Figure 6 offers some insights about
two potential pricing strategies. There are two price points (around $7.50
and $12.60), that roughly correspond to two pricing strategies commonly
used in new product pricing [e.g., Tellis (1986)]: (i) a “skimming” strategy
that targets only a high-value consumer segment (hence achieving very low
volume, but high profit per transaction), and (ii) a “penetration” strategy
where the retailer sets the price lower in order to achiever a higher initial
penetration, but a lower profit-per-transaction. The relative effectiveness of
each strategy depends on the value of k, that is, the amount of weight that
the manager puts on his prior belief.
The estimated profit maximizing prices are $12.6, $7.66, $7.52 and $7.50
for k = δ,10,20,50, respectively. We find that for k < 4, a skimming strat-
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Fig. 5. Posterior estimates of the consumer valuation distribution F . The solid line is
the manager’s prior belief; the other four lines represent, from top to bottom, the posterior
estimates for the four values k = δ,10,20,50, respectively.
egy is more attractive; for k > 4, a penetration strategy gives better profits.
Thus, our method allows the retailer to quantify and compare the effective-
ness of skimming vs. penetration strategies at any given k. Note also that
somewhat counter-intuitively, a stochastically higher valuation distribution
(using larger k) here leads to a lower optimal price. Although at each price
a larger percentage of customers will buy the product, the effect of this on
profits is more pronounced at the lower prices.
As can be seen in Figure 6, it appears that by incorporating some degree
of prior managerial knowledge, the optimal price is estimated to be around
$7.50. This can be used as a starting point for pricing the new jewelry
product. Based on our recommendations, the jeweler implemented a fixed
price of $7.49 when the new jewelry product was brought into market in late
2006.
Our method allows us to not only estimate the profit-maximizing price,
but also to quantify the uncertainty for estimated profits under the optimal
price, by using the posterior sample draws from the Po´lya tree. Figure 7
displays the pointwise 90% posterior intervals for the profit function when
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Fig. 6. Estimated profit functions for the Po´lya tree method after incorporating manage-
rial prior knowledge; k = δ (thick solid line), k = 10 (thin solid line); k = 20 (broken line);
k = 50 (dotted line).
k = 20, which reflects the degree of uncertainty for our results. For example,
the estimated profit (for the k = 20 case) at the optimal price of $7.48 is $0.14
per bidder, with a 90% posterior interval of ($0.09, $0.18). This provides the
retailer with an estimate of the range of profit that can be obtained.
6. Discussion and future research. In this paper we have developed a non-
parametric Bayesian methodology that enables retailers to estimate the op-
timal price for a new product by learning about the consumer valuation
distribution from second-price auction data. Using a flexible Po´lya tree dis-
tribution to represent uncertainty about the unknown consumer valuation
distribution, we have proposed a Po´lya tree prior formulation and computa-
tional approach that allows for fast updating of the hyperparameters using
only second highest order statistics obtained from a set of auctions. Through
collaboration with an online jewelry retailer, we apply our methodology to
incorporate managerial prior beliefs and derive the optimal price for a new
jewelry product. The generality of our proposed methodology allows for its
application to many different products.
A key to the computational advantages of our setup is the use of the
observed second order statistics as the cutpoints for the prior partition Π0
in (5). Although strict Bayesian coherence is violated by the use of the data
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Fig. 7. Pointwise 90% posterior intervals of the profit function (k = 20 case).
to formulate the prior partition, it does not seem that the injected structural
information is creating a particular bias.15 Nonetheless, because the Po´lya
tree posterior may still be influenced by Π0 in addition to A0, it is important
to be mindful of the impact of some of its basic characteristics. While Po´lya
tree generalizations involving random partitions [e.g., Paddock et al. (2003),
Wong and Ma (2010)] would be a way to mitigate this influence, the compu-
tational burdens of their implementation would likely be overwhelming for
the second-price auction data.
One aspect of Π0 that does appear to incur some systematic bias is the
assignment of the yi2’s to the upper intervals (e.g., y12 ∈B1;y22 ∈B01, etc.)
by defining the upper intervals Bε1 in (5) to be left closed. However, the
upward bias resulting from posterior updating with this upper interval as-
signment is substantially smaller than the downward bias that would result
from a lower interval assignment (details available upon request). Another
alternative, left for future research, might be to consider partial probabilistic
assignments of each of the yi2’s to both intervals.
15Note that we only endorse a data-dependent partition insofar as the yi2’s are used
as the cutpoints. Beyond that, further data-dependent partitions may be ill advised. To
take an extreme example, suppose one introduced the finer partitions B10 = [y12, y12 + δ]
and B11 = [y12 + δ, y
∗]. For small enough δ, the resulting posterior would allocate an
inappropriate amount of weight to the very small interval B10.
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Finally, the choice of the left telescoping hierarchy does also influence the
posterior. As illustrated in Web Appendix I [George and Hui (2011)], this
influence of the chosen hierarchy is lessened when αε = γmH(Bε) with γm
chosen very small, so that γm is approximately constant, at least at the
lower levels. However, this strategy would be inappropriate for the scenario
in Section 5.3, where we would not want to minimize the impact of an
informative managerial prior. Due to the level dependent weighting of the
prior through m2, the intervals at the deeper levels have a stronger prior,
resulting in a posterior that will be sensitive to the choice of hierarchy. In
future work, it may be useful to consider alternative hierarchies that may
better represent the manager’s prior beliefs and uncertainty about them.
We leave the issue of eliciting the most reasonable hierarchy and associated
level-dependent weighting function as a future research direction.
To conclude, our research adds to the recent and growing stream of lit-
erature on the use of Bayesian nonparametric techniques in marketing [e.g.,
Braun et al. (2006), Brezger and Steiner (2008), Kim, Menzefricke and Fein-
berg (2004, 2007), Sood, James and Tellis (2009)]. Bayesian nonparametric
techniques provide a rich toolkit that allows modelers to avoid imposing
restrictive parametric functional forms. Braun et al. (2006) and Kim, Men-
zefricke and Feinberg (2004) utilize a Dirichlet process prior to specify the
heterogeneity distribution; Brezger and Steiner (2008) and Kim, Menzefricke
and Feinberg (2007) use a Bayesian spline approach to model the price re-
sponse function. In the same spirit, this paper introduces the Po´lya tree prior
to model uncertainty about an unknown consumer valuation distribution for
the purpose of optimal price estimation. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first marketing application to make use of a Po´lya tree distribution;
we certainly hope that in the future, this flexible class of distributions will
be added to the modeler’s toolkit.
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Web Appendix for “Optimal pricing using online auction experiments:
A Po´lya tree approach” (DOI: 10.1214/11-AOAS503SUPP; .pdf). Robust-
ness checks for the left telescoping hierarchy and the IPV assumption can
be found in the supplemental article.
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